Tillegra Dam: socioeconomics
An independent review

Prepared for
NSW Department of Planning

Centre for International Economics
Canberra & Sydney

October 2010
The Centre for International Economics is a private economic research agency that provides professional, independent and timely analysis of international and domestic events and policies.

The CIE's professional staff arrange, undertake and publish commissioned economic research and analysis for industry, corporations, governments, international agencies and individuals.

© Centre for International Economics 2010

This work is copyright. Persons wishing to reproduce this material should contact the Centre for International Economics at one of the following addresses.

**Canberra**

Centre for International Economics  
11 Lancaster Place,  
Majura Park  
ACT 2609  
GPO Box 2203  
Canberra  
ACT  
Australia  
2601  
Telephone  +61 2 6245 7800  
Facsimile  +61 2 6245 7888  
Email  cie@TheCIE.com.au  
Website  www.TheCIE.com.au

**Sydney**

Centre for International Economics  
Suite 2, Level 16, 1 York Street  
Sydney  
NSW 2000  
GPO Box 397  
Sydney  
NSW  
Australia  
2001  
Telephone  +61 2 9250 0800  
Facsimile  +61 2 9250 0888  
Email  ciesyd@TheCIE.com.au  
Website  www.TheCIE.com.au

**Disclaimer**

While The CIE endeavours to provide reliable analysis and believes the material it presents is accurate, it will not be liable for any party acting on such information.
# Contents

1 Introduction  
   The context for this review 5  
   The scope of this review 6  

2 Review of methodological framework for assessing options 10  
   Overview of Hunter Water’s approach 10  
   Best Practice Approach 11  
   Cost–effectiveness analysis versus cost–benefit analysis 12  
   Some limitations of Hunter Water’s framework 13  

3 The economic model 24  
   Options analysed in the economic model 24  
   Timing of expenditure in the model 25  
   The magnitude of the costs 26  
   Costs excluded from the model 29  
   Economywide effects of the Dam 30  
   Sensitivity testing 34  

4 Conclusions 36  
   Key findings 38  
   Way forward 39  

APPENDIXES 41  
A The cost of water restrictions 43  
B Calculation of reliable yield 46  
C ‘Next steps’ identified in draft report 48  
D Hunter Water’s response to the draft report 50  
References 59  

Boxes, charts and tables  
1.1 Key documentation considered 8  
2.1 Key features of a Best Practice Approach 11  
2.2 Forecast supply-demand balance 15  
2.3 Hunter water supply system performance in drought 22
1 Introduction

On 13 November 2007, the Minister for Planning issued an Order (under section 75B of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, the NSW EPA Act) that declared that the Minister’s approval under Part 3A of the Act was required for the proposed Tillegra Dam (the Dam) in Hunter Water Corporation’s area of operation. On 13 May 2009, the Minister for Planning also declared the Dam to be a ‘critical infrastructure project’ under section 75C of the Act.

The NSW Department of Planning (NSW Planning) is responsible for providing advice to the Minister on (amongst other things) matters relating to the Dam. NSW Planning has commissioned the CIE to review the economic analysis undertaken by Hunter Water that supports the conclusion that the Dam is the best solution to meet the Hunter region’s future water needs. This report outlines the CIE’s findings.

The context for this review

Hunter Water Corporation (HWC) is seeking approval to construct a 450 gigalitre (GL) dam at Tillegra, near Dungog in the Upper Williams River catchment. The Dam is proposed to be located on the Upper Williams River, within the localities of Tillegra and Munni. The Dam would inundate an area of approximately 2100 hectares at Full Supply Level. The project is within the Dungog Local Government Area, within the Hunter region of NSW, approximately 70 kilometres north of Newcastle. The Dam would be operated by Hunter Water as part of its portfolio of other supply sources.

The proposal is a project to which Part 3A of the NSW EPA Act applies by virtue of an Order made by the Minister for Planning under section 75B of the Act on 13 November 2007. Consequently, the Minister for Planning is the approval authority for the project. On 13 May 2009, the Minister for Planning formed an Opinion under section 75C of the EPA Act that the project is essential for the State for economic and social reasons and therefore declared the project to be a critical infrastructure project.

The project was also declared a ‘controlled action’ on 23 January 2009 under the Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC), for downstream impacts to RAMSAR wetlands, in the Hunter Estuary.

The project will be assessed under Part 3A of the NSW EPA Act and will also be conducted in accordance with clause 13.2 of the Bilateral Agreement between NSW
and the Commonwealth, made under the EPBC Act, relating to environmental impact assessment.

The Environmental Assessment for the proposal was exhibited from 10 September 2009 until 13 November 2009, and 2659 public submissions were received. Over 25 per cent of submissions questioned the need for the project and whether it had been appropriately justified.

**The scope of this review**

NSW Planning has engaged the CIE to review the socioeconomic analysis undertaken in relation to the Dam. Our approach to this review is determined by the Terms of Reference specified and the committed budget for this project. The Terms of Reference require us to specifically review the:

- validity and appropriateness of the economic valuation technique used by the Proponent (Hunter Water) to identify the preferred solution;
- validity and appropriateness of the modelling used to assess the social and economic impacts of the proposal; and
- appropriateness and accuracy of the assumptions used in the socioeconomic valuation and modelling.

Where the modelling is found to be deficient we are required to provide suggestions of any amendments that would be required to improve the rigour of the modelling, its output or the interpretations drawn from it.

Additionally we are required to comment on:

- whether the economic analysis supports the conclusion that Tillegra Dam is the best solution to meet the future water supply needs of Hunter Water;
- whether there are alternative measures that could deliver similar economic and social benefits; and
- the Proponent’s assessment of the performance of all water supply augmentation options (providing the same level of drought security over the same timeframe as the Tillegra Dam proposal).

Our draft report was provided to Hunter Water for comment in early July 2010. In response, Hunter Water provided detailed comments on a number of issues in our report as well as additional modelling. Where there have been errors of fact identified we have modified the main body of this report. However, we have considered the majority of Hunter Water’s response to our draft report in appendix D. This will provide readers with greater transparency and will assist readers to examine any new information that has been submitted in relation to Tillegra Dam.
**Our approach**

Our approach to this review focuses largely on the analytical framework used to examine the different options available and the socioeconomic modelling undertaken to support this. The framework and the modelling are the key stages in the analysis that consider the Dam against its alternatives. This is the critical phase of the analysis that supports the conclusion that the Dam is the best alternative to meet the long term water supply of the region.

Given the scope of the review we have chosen to focus on those aspects that could have a material impact on the conclusions reached in the analysis. In particular, we seek to comment on whether any identified gaps or limitations in the analysis could change the ranking of the different options considered.

Without conducting detailed modelling of the alternative options it is not possible for us to comment conclusively on whether alternative options may be preferred to the Dam. Instead we focus on the assumptions and comment on the extent to which these options influence the conclusion regarding the Dam. We also seek to comment on how changing the assumptions would change the nature of the results.

We are not in a position to comment on the detailed costings used to model the alternative options considered. This would require a more specific review of the individual assumptions. Where possible we have, however, drawn on relevant information available from economic analysis conducted in other jurisdictions throughout Australia. However, we can only draw general conclusions from this information due to the site specific nature of the costs and impacts associated with these projects.

In undertaking this study we have relied primarily on the publicly available documentation as well as some confidential information provided to us by NSW Planning. This includes the spreadsheet model prepared by Aurecon (and provided to NSW Planning) that was utilised as part of the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA).

It should be noted that this study reviews the robustness of the economic analysis related to the decision to construct the Dam. This does not extend to undertaking separate modelling to advise on the ‘optimal’ range of measures to meet the long term water needs of the region.

**Documentation reviewed**

The key documents that we have assessed for this review are presented in box 1.1 below.
1.1 Key documentation considered

The following areas of the Environmental Assessment Report (EAR) have been considered:

- the CEA and computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling undertaken by the Proponent (Section 3.5 of the EAR and Working Paper G (review of CEA and CGE)); and
- the socioeconomic impacts of the Tillegra Dam proposal (chapter 12 and Working Paper G (review of socioeconomics)).

Additionally, we were also required to review the following documents:

- Proponent’s Submissions Report;
- submission from Dr Geoffrey Wells (University of South Australia) titled ‘Technical Comments on the ‘Socio-economic Assessment’ undertaken by HWC and Aurecon for the Tillegra Dam Planning and Environmental Assessment Report’;
- report by G. Kuczera, Review of Tillegra Dam Project Justification as Presented in the HWC Submissions Report; and
- Proponent Briefing Note — Tillegra Dam — combination of options for direct comparison.

We have also drawn on previous analysis undertaken by Hunter Water such as the ‘Why Tillegra Now’ document (Hunter Water Corporation 2007) and the H250 Plan (Hunter Water Corporation 2008).

Our draft report was provided to Hunter Water for comment. Hunter Water has provided a detailed response to a number of issues raised and have presented the results of additional modelling undertaken. We have separately considered this additional material in appendix D.

Structure of this report

The structure of this report is as follows:

- chapter 2 reviews the methodological framework adopted to assess the different options;
- chapter 3 considers the economic modelling undertaken in the CEA and the CGE analysis undertaken to assess the potential economywide impacts of the Dam. This relates to the original modelling undertaken by Hunter Water and Aurecon; and
chapter 4 draws together our findings on the robustness of the economic analysis in relation to the Dam and conclusions drawn from the analysis in regards to the choice of the Dam as the highest ranked option.

As noted previously, Hunter Water was provided with the opportunity to review our draft report. This has resulted in some minor changes in chapters 2 and 3 which we have incorporated into this final report.

In response to our draft report Hunter Water has also presented additional information and undertaken additional modelling. We have chosen to review this additional material in an appendix to this report (Appendix D). This will allow readers to consider our review of the original analysis undertaken by Hunter Water as well as the review of the additional information and modelling that was undertaken by Hunter Water following our draft report.

Our conclusions presented in chapter 4 are based on our review of both the initial analysis undertaken by Hunter Water and its revised modelling.
2 Review of methodological framework for assessing options

This chapter summarises the broad approach adopted by Hunter Water to assess the different options that were considered to meet the future water needs of the region. This is followed by a critique of this approach, with particular focus on some of the key elements.

Overview of Hunter Water’s approach

In considering the range of options available to meet the future water supply requirements of the region, Hunter Water (with assistance from Aurecon) adopted the following approach.

- **Step 1.** Specify the water reliability and security objectives that all options are required to meet. The need for new infrastructure has been justified on the basis of a supply–demand imbalance.

- **Step 2.** Assess the direct financial impacts by using a CEA. The CEA was initially undertaken as part of the report *Why Tillegra Now?* and reproduced in Hunter Water’s H250 Plan. Additional analysis, based on slightly revised costing information (such as updated figures to incorporate inflation), was also undertaken by Aurecon as part of the EAR.

- **Step 3.** Assess the indirect impacts of all options through a qualitative analysis. This analysis was undertaken as part of the report *Why Tillegra Now?* and Hunter Water’s H250 Plan. The matrix table summarising the qualitative impacts was also reproduced in the analysis undertaken by Aurecon.

- **Step 4.** Report the economywide impacts of the Dam through the use of CGE analysis. This analysis was reported in the EAR, although it did not form part of the options analysis.

In summary, Hunter Water’s approach to examining the choice of alternative options to meet the water needs of the lower Hunter region can be considered as an optimisation problem. This seeks to find the best solution (from a range of possibilities) to meet the specified objectives and constraints.

In regards to the analysis undertaken by Hunter Water the objective is to minimise costs subject to providing sufficient supply to ensure that demand can be met at all times (over the next 40 to 50 years) and quantitative water restrictions applying for
no more than a specified level. In this instance cost is defined as the direct financial costs to Hunter Water associated with the different options.

The indirect impacts (particularly the indirect environmental and social impacts) of the different options are not quantified and do not form part of the optimisation problem. Instead these indirect impacts are separately considered in a qualitative framework.

**Best Practice Approach**

Determining the best options to deliver future water needs is a complex task. It requires a substantial amount of information to be collected and drawn together into a framework that allows systematic analysis of different options. The framework needs to draw together ideas from a range of disciplines such as hydrology, engineering, statistics, economics and environmental and social sciences.

It is worth considering some of the key features that need to be considered in a best practice approach. Some of the key features are presented in table 2.1 below. In the table we identify the extent to which these features have been incorporated in the Hunter Water and Aurecon’s analysis. This is not intended to provide a detailed critique of Hunter Water’s approach but provides a snapshot of the extent to which the approach incorporates some of the key features of a best practice approach.

### 2.1 Key features of a Best Practice Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Features</th>
<th>Extent incorporated into Hunter Water’s analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of hydrology of system and long term system supply</td>
<td>Yes. Hunter Water utilises a complex hydrology model that generates simulated scenarios of possible future inflow events based on historical records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of future demand</td>
<td>Yes. Hunter Water appears to have a good understanding of the potential impacts of factors such as population growth, the demographic shifts in the population and demand management programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Options available to meet demand</td>
<td>Yes. The analysis considers seven options. Other options could potentially be included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of impact of alternatives on security and reliability</td>
<td>Limited. It is likely that Hunter Water has undertaken more detailed analysis but the information has not been presented. For example, information could be provided on the impacts on minimum storage levels under alternative inflow scenarios and information on the average time in restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of impacts of timing on alternative options</td>
<td>No. The alternative options are only considered to be introduced at a fixed point in time (e.g. 2011). There is limited consideration of how changing the timing of introduction of measures can impact on the costs (in net present value terms).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)
2.1 **Key features of a Best Practice Approach** (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Features</th>
<th>Extent incorporated into Hunter Water’s analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of the value of deferring construction of costly infrastructure</td>
<td>No. The alternative supply options are costly and irreversible once constructed. It is important to consider options to defer the construction of this infrastructure without significantly compromising security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of joint effects through ‘portfolio analysis’</td>
<td>No. The analysis considers individual options and does not consider how these interact with other measures in the existing supply system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial costs</td>
<td>Yes. Information is presented for all options. Greater transparency on some of the cost information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental and social impacts</td>
<td>Limited. There is limited analysis presented on these impacts for all the options.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The CIE.*

It is important to recognise that meeting best practice requires significant information to assist in the decision making process. The extent to which a best practice approach can be readily applied, therefore, depends partly on the availability of information or the ability to gather this information in a reasonable timeframe.

The remainder of this report considers in more detail the extent to which Hunter Water and Aurecon have incorporated these features into its approach to considering the Dam and alternative options.

**Cost–effectiveness analysis versus cost–benefit analysis**

The best practice approach is typically incorporated into an economic framework that allows consideration of the tradeoffs that exist between the different options. Hunter Water and Aurecon’s analysis can be classified as a cost–effectiveness analysis (CEA) where a least cost solution is sought to meet the long term supply requirements and minimum levels of service.

The CEA approach has been criticised by Dr Geoffrey Wells (2009) in his submission to the EAR. Dr Wells argues that international best practice specifies the use of a wider BCA framework to review the different options. He refutes the arguments submitted by Aurecon that seek to justify the use of a more limited CEA and notes the preference specified in NSW Treasury guidelines for a BCA framework.

We support Dr Wells’ conclusion that a BCA framework is preferable to the narrower CEA framework where robust information is available and can be incorporated into the analysis. In theory a BCA framework draws together significantly more information to assess the full impacts of the alternative options. It incorporates both the direct and indirect impacts as well as the use and non-use values. This is particularly relevant for large scale infrastructure projects which often have a diverse range of impacts and where complex tradeoffs are required to be considered.
In Professor Kuczera’s advice to Hunter Water he recognises that there are likely to be a range of complex tradeoffs that are required to be made between the different options. However, his advice is that these tradeoffs require value judgements to be made and that these are most appropriately made by policy makers. In a BCA framework these values are sought to be explicitly incorporated into the analysis.

In theory a BCA approach is preferred for examining complex infrastructure projects which have diverse impacts. However, in practice where robust information is not readily available then a BCA framework is difficult to apply in a robust manner. In this situation a CEA framework may be reasonable to adopt. That is, a CEA framework can offer decision makers with good information to assist to evaluate alternative options. For example, many of the features in a best practice approach noted above apply equally to a BCA and a CEA. A CEA approach can also be supplemented with other information to assist policy makers, such as detailed modelling of environmental and social impacts.

Further, it is the application of the approach that is often of greatest importance. For example, if a BCA applies assumptions that are not robust then it can result in misleading conclusions being reached. Therefore, the remainder of this report focuses largely on Hunter Water and Aurecon’s application of the CEA framework.

The CEA approach adopted by Hunter Water to review the infrastructure options is similar to the approach used in Sydney’s 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan to assess the different options. In this regard it was a typical approach to analyse alternative options at that point in time. However, since that time there has been significant advances to the approach adopted to analyse enhancements to the water supply system.

Sydney’s 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan, for example, made significant changes in recognition of the limitations of the approach adopted in the 2004 Plan. Further improvements have also been made in the CEA framework that was recently used to consider the range of options for Sydney’s recently released 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan.

Therefore, while we believe that a more detailed BCA does (in theory) provide the most robust analysis, even under a CEA framework significant improvements can be made to the approach used by Hunter Water. Some of the limitations of Hunter Water’s CEA framework are discussed further below.

**Some limitations of Hunter Water’s framework**

Under Hunter Water’s CEA framework the benefits of the alternative options being evaluated are considered to be the same across all options. CEA is often justified in the context of evaluating alternative water supply schemes on the grounds that all the measures seek to meet customers’ demand for water related services. Customers
need the service that water provides rather than the water itself.\textsuperscript{1} Therefore, if the same service can be provided at a lower cost to the community by improving efficiency then this represents better value than providing more water, depending on the upfront costs of achieving the efficiency gain (White and Howe 1998). Hence in Hunter Water’s CEA framework, the focus of the analysis is only on one side (the cost side) of the equation.

It is not clear to us that it is valid to assume that the benefits are the same across all the options examined by Hunter Water and Aurecon. This point was also raised by Professor Kuczera, although his comments related to the fact that the options reached a supply–demand imbalance at different times into the future. Hunter Water and Aurecon have attempted to overcome this issue by using ‘levelised costs’ that converts the costs into a dollar per unit of water delivered. This was believed to allow projects to be compared on an equal basis. There are a range of concerns regarding the use of levelised costs discussed further below.

Apart from the issue raised by Professor Kuczera there are also a range of other reasons why we believe that the benefits are not likely to be the same across each of the different options. These include differences in:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the level of reliability provided by the options (i.e. water restrictions);
  \item the probability of hitting low storage levels and triggering the need for additional investments (under the Drought Emergency Management Plan); and
  \item the environmental and social impacts of the project.
\end{itemize}

However, perhaps the key limitations in Hunter Water’s approach is the treatment of the timing of different options, the incorporation of risk and uncertainty and the approach taken to incorporate environmental and social impacts into the decision-making framework. These issues are discussed first, before considering the assumption that benefits are the same across all options.

### Timing of the capital expenditure — the value of deferral

In Hunter Water’s analysis the timing of alternative options is not considered in detail. In Hunter Water’s approach the timing of when to introduce new options is largely based on the concept of supply-demand balance (using the reliable yield calculation). Hunter Water has estimated that there is supply–demand imbalance such that the current supply sources are not expected to be able to meet the demand over the long term. The estimated supply-demand balance is presented in table 2.2 below.

---

\textsuperscript{1} For example, customers can gain the same utility from showering with less water by showering using low-flow showerheads.
2.2 Forecast supply-demand balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reliable yield from existing sources*</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>GL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forecast demand</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>109.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortfall</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-22.2</td>
<td>-42.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Appendix B provides an explanation of the concept of ‘reliable yield’.

Note: Forecast demand includes estimated savings from demand management, recycling and leakage reduction programs. Existing sources include Grahamstown dam, Chicester dam, Tomago sandbeds and Anna Bay sandbeds.


Given that there is currently a supply-demand deficit this is seen as the need for new investments immediately. In their analysis all options are assumed to occur at a fixed point in time (in approximately 2011). There does not appear to be recognition that there could be significant reduction in costs (in net present value terms) from being able to defer the construction of large scale infrastructure that is irreversible.²

This point has been recognised in the development of Sydney’s Metropolitan Water Plans since 2004. The focus on the analysis has shifted away from a sole reliance on the supply–demand balance to the use of other information such as the current storage levels and depletion rates as well as the introduction of measures that reduce the lead time for constructing infrastructure. This specifically recognises that there is value for the community in being able to defer the construction of expensive infrastructure to a ‘just in time’ basis. This point is particularly relevant for catchments such as in the Sydney and Hunter regions which have highly variable rainfall where dams can fill (as well as deplete) rapidly.

The timing of investment decisions should be based on the contribution of the options to the value of water in-use, including environmental water, compared with the costs. This recognises the trade-off between the value of security and providing this extra service.

Therefore, the optimal timing to make additional large scale investments is a balance between delaying the decision to provide the greatest chance to capture large rainfall events (which provide a cheap source of water) and not allowing dam levels to deplete to such a level as to pose a threat to the security of the system. Based on the documentation that we have reviewed it does not appear that this analysis has been undertaken.

Risk and uncertainty

Policy makers that have to make investment decisions rarely have full information about the future. Therefore, they are required to make decisions in the context of a

² Hunter Water’s revised analysis presented in appendix D adopts a trigger level for the construction of the desalination plant which takes account of the value of deferring plants.
range of possible results for the key factors that impact on the costs and benefits from the project. This is particularly true for investment decisions in the water sector where there are a wide range of factors that are not known with certainty, such as:

- the future climatic conditions which determine the probabilities of being in restrictions;\(^3\)
- the future demand for water, which is subject to variability both from consumption rates and overall population levels;
- the extent to which security is actually increased by a particular project; and
- the costs of the particular water supply option, including the capital costs in future years.

Risk and uncertainty capture the degree to which the future is unknown. The term risk refers to events about which a probability distribution for possible outcomes is known, while uncertainty refers to events about which there is no information on the probability distribution. In practice the terms are blurred and estimates of the probability distribution are made with greater or lesser accuracy.

The treatment of risk and uncertainty should be central to the decision regarding enhancements to the water supply system. This is being increasingly recognised and tools are gradually evolving to assist in the decision making process. For example, in Sydney’s 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan there was a major shift toward an adaptive management approach, which recognised the value of having flexible systems that could develop as new information became available (for example, varying storage levels, changing short term and longer term rainfall expectations).

It is important to recognise that climate change is not only about potential changes in average rainfall. It is also expected to involve greater volatility and duration in rainfall patterns. This may potentially result in a greater chance of being at relatively low storage levels necessitating a greater reliance on water restrictions.\(^4\)

Climate change is also about a higher level of uncertainty regarding future supply. That is, there is no information about the probability of the extreme events occurring. In situations of increased uncertainty water supply strategies that offer greater flexibility in responding to new situations are likely to be more ‘valuable’ compared with those more traditional approaches. From the documentation that we have

---

\(^3\) The underlying rainfall characteristics are an important driver of the water supply options chosen. For example, the UK is characterised by a low intensity and steady rainfall pattern compared to, for example, Newcastle and Sydney where the systems are more volatile. In the more volatile systems there is greater probability that rainfall will be significantly different to the mean, compared to catchments with more stable rainfall.

\(^4\) Climate change also touches on aspects of urban water management. For instance, there may be a higher risk of bushfires destroying water supply catchments or a greater volume of pollutants entering storages during extreme rainfall events.
reviewed it does not appear that these issues have been considered in any detail by Hunter Water and Aurecon.

Professor Kuczera’s review recognises the importance of uncertainty in this context and suggests that scenario analysis could usefully be conducted. Using scenario analysis Hunter Water could usefully explore the performance of the different options under different drought situations such as the performance of the Dam if it were constructed in 2010 and the worst historical drought occurred over the next five to ten years. It is important to understand whether the Drought Management Plan (DMP) would be triggered and additional investments required. It would be useful to explore the drought performance under different assumptions regarding the ‘starting storage level’ when a drought commences as well as the performance under different levels of demand.

In the scenarios above, Hunter Water should also present the outcome of the combined costs of both the Dam and the DMP. This would provide a clearer picture of the costs that are likely to be faced under the different scenarios. It is also important that all costs are reported on a risk-weighted basis to take account of whether there is only some probability that the costs would be incurred.

The scenario analysis would provide decision makers and the community with a more detailed understanding of the potential risks faced and the extent to which they are willing to accept a higher risk at the expense of lower expected costs. It is important therefore that both the ‘risk and return’ outcomes are considered in the analysis. The community is likely to place more value on those options that face less risk and uncertainty, where they have similar average outcomes.

*Treatment of joint effects*

Hunter Water and Aurecon’s analysis is based on an analysis of seven individual options. The examination of individual options has historically been adopted by utilities in considering additional water supply investments. For example, a similar approach was adopted in Sydney’s 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan.

More recently, analysts have recognised the importance of examining ‘portfolios’ of options, rather than individual options in isolation. Undertaking analysis at the portfolio level takes into account the interactions between individual projects as well as

---

5 In this regard, Kingsford and Hankin 2010 (p. 42) noted that if a dry period similar to that which occurred in 1935 occurred it would have taken Tillegra Dam 15 years to fill. During a wet period similar to that which occurred in 1971 it would have taken approximately eight years to fill. Hunter Water, however, argues that dams do not need to be at full capacity to supply water.

6 Examination of the risk and return characteristics is a basic principle of investment analysis and covers all forms of investment.
as the existing system assets. For example, the per unit water savings achieved by a demand management program may be reduced if it is combined with measures such as imposing restrictions more frequently because this reduces the amount of water used by households.

Finding the best, or ‘optimal’, portfolio will require consideration of the type, timing and sequencing of new projects and the operation of existing infrastructure and programs. Timing can determine both the level of a particular project, and have an effect in determining the present value of these costs from a portfolio. As new water supply options are often long term capital intensive investments, exactly when they are put in place and exactly when impacts on reliability/security start to accrue will have a large influence on their net costs (expressed in present value terms).

The concept of portfolio analysis is commonly used to analyse different water supply and demand side options. For example, the analysis undertaken in relation to the Traveston Crossing Dam in South-East Queensland considered five alternative portfolios. In each of the five portfolios examined, the ‘existing’ measures that were currently in place or would be operating in the near future (such as the Gold Coast desalination plant) were included as well as combinations of new measures.

The importance of portfolio analysis was also recognised in the 2006 Sydney Metropolitan Water Plan and is the basis of the upcoming 2010 Plan. In the 2010 Plan between 20 and 30 portfolios of different options were considered. These included combinations of different measures (which include, for example, different levels of quantitative restrictions) as well as consideration of the timing of new measures.

It is important that the analysis be undertaken in the context of portfolios so as to take account of the interaction or joint effects with other parts of the system.

**Different environmental and social impacts**

Typically a rigorous economic analysis would require an understanding of how the different options impact on the aggregate welfare of society. A full BCA brings together the wide range of direct and indirect benefits/costs into the same monetary terms so that the aggregate social welfare can be determined. This requires placing values on those impacts where observable market data may not be available. Often this information may not be readily available and requires detailed data collection from the community through systematic surveys that are specifically designed for this purpose. Alternatively, the findings from systematic surveys conducted in other regions can be used (this is known as the ‘benefits transfer’ technique). However, this may only be possible where there are sufficient similarities with the characteristics of the socioeconomic profile in the original study.

Further, detailed modelling of environmental and social impacts would be required to convert these impacts into monetary values. This requires, for example, an understanding of the potential impacts under a range of climatic scenarios. Often
environmental impacts are ‘non-linear’ where, for example, impacts may be small up to a point but then become significant (and potentially irreversible) once a ‘tipping-point’ is reached.

It is also important to understand the potential indirect impacts of the alternative options. For example, in the case of Sydney’s desalination plant it is becoming increasingly recognised that drawing more water from the plant also has the potential to reduce the amount of water required to be drawn from the catchment, providing environmental benefits particularly during dry times.

Where factors are not directly monetised and incorporated into the economic analysis, it is common for the analysis to seek to incorporate this information into the analysis in a qualitative fashion. Hunter Water has adopted this approach in its consideration of the environmental and social impacts. These are presented in a matrix summarised in table 3.1 of the EAR. The EAR also has a more detailed assessment of the potential environmental and social impacts of the Dam (although not the other options).7

While we believe that a BCA framework provides the most robust approach to incorporate the environmental and social impacts we recognise that, in practice, detailed information may not be available to conduct a full analysis of all the impacts. In the absence of this, alternative quantitative or qualitative approaches could be adopted.8

In our view the qualitative analysis undertaken by Hunter Water as presented in a matrix form only provides the first step in outlining the range of potential indirect impacts of the proposals. Some of the limitations of the approach presented in the matrix include the following.

- It appears that not all of the impacts have been addressed. For example, a key potential environmental impact associated with the Dam involves flows to the Kooragang Island Wetlands (Kingsford and Hankin 2010). Further, in considering alternatives to the Dam another issue that should be considered is the potential positive environmental impact of the desalination plant on the volume of water that needs to be drawn from catchments (particularly in droughts when rivers may be stressed). There are likely to be a range of other issues that have not been incorporated into the matrix.

- For each option the matrix does not provide any indication of the relative importance of the issues discussed. For example, in regards to the Dam it is not

---

7 Appendix A of the Why Tillegra Now? (Hunter Water Corporation 2007) document also provides a description of the environmental and social attributes of the different options.

8 Other approaches such as Multi-Criteria Analysis are often commonly used to incorporate the non-market impacts. We have not discussed some of the limitations of these approaches. A critique of this can be found in Dobes and Bennett (2009).
clear whether inundation of the major roadways is a more significant issue compared with inundation of the 2100 hectares of farmland.

- The matrix provides little information to judge the order of magnitude difference between the same issues raised for the different options. For example, one of the perceived advantages of the Dam is that it ‘diversifies water source options’. A similar statement is made in relation to the desalination option considered. However, the matrix provides no information to judge how much larger (or smaller) the diversifications benefits of the Dam are versus the desalination plant.

- The matrix identifies the gross impacts rather than the net impacts. For example, one of the perceived advantages of the Dam is the potential recreational use. While the Dam may result in additional recreational use this may come at the expense of recreational activities in other parts of the region. Therefore, it is net social gain that is most relevant.

**Assumption that benefits are the same across all options**

**Different levels of reliability**

The supply side in the supply–demand balance is typically calculated by the use of the concept of ‘reliable yield’. The concept of reliable yield has been commonly used throughout Australia as a method to determine the average long term supply that can be delivered from only traditional rain-fed sources of water supply, such as dams.

However, non-traditional sources of supply have very different characteristics. For example, desalination plants can deliver the same quantity of water during drought periods. Therefore, while the desalination plant and the Dam may deliver the same quantity of water on average, the desalination plant could offer additional benefits such as comparatively less time in restrictions, as it can provide the same quantity of water in all climatic circumstances.\(^9\)

In our view, where the different supply options offer higher levels of service compared with the minimum then this should be accounted for in the analysis. This can readily be incorporated into the analysis by explicitly placing a cost on restrictions.\(^10\)

---

\(^9\) In the calculation of reliable yield minimum service levels are specified. While all the alternative options examined meet these minimum levels, it is important to also recognize that some options may deliver higher levels of service (above the minimum) compared to other options.

\(^10\) The cost of restrictions can also be incorporated into a CEA framework. These costs were incorporated into the analysis recently completed for the 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan for Sydney.
The community is likely to place value in having a more secure and reliable source of water. Given this, it is important to incorporate the differences in the reliability and security offered by alternative measures into the analysis. Further, modelling would be required to understand the different levels of service provided by each of the portfolios examined. If there are large differences in service level this could change the ranking of different options.

**Probability of triggering Drought Management Plan**

Hunter Water’s analysis of the different options appears to be focused primarily on the seven options to meet future growth needs and does not consider the contribution of each of these options to meeting needs during drought. Hunter Water separately considers the additional investments that would be required in drought through its DMP.

The investments proposed in the DMP are summarised in chapter 3 of the EAR.\(^{11}\) Basically this involves the construction of a $1 billion desalination plant and additional investments to increase capacity to draw water from groundwater sources. It is anticipated that these additional investments would be made when dam levels drop to around 70 per cent of total capacity. Chart 2.3 below provides an illustration of the investments envisaged under the DMP if Hunter Water was faced with a worst drought on record over the next few years.

The options analysis undertaken by Hunter Water and Aurecon does not appear to consider the relationship between these investments and the investment that would be required if the DMP were triggered.

In our view there are clear interlinkages between the seven options that are primarily focused on meeting growth needs and the investments in the DMP. For example, while the Dam may result in significant excess capacity to meet current demand under average climatic conditions it also has the added benefit of providing a buffer that could prevent additional investments under the DMP in the advent of a bad drought.\(^{12}\)

If the seven options differ in their probability of triggering the DMP then it is important that these differences be accounted for in the options analysis. Given that the construction and fill period for the Dam is longer than, for example, the desalination plant option we would expect there to be significant differences between the options in the probability of triggering the DMP over the first 10 year period of

---

\(^{11}\) Pages 3.10 and 3.11.

\(^{12}\) In its revised modeling of the Dam (discussed in appendix D) Hunter Water has taken account of both the cost of the Dam combined with the DMP. However, for this option Hunter Water assumes that the DMP is suspended for the first six years of the analysis and is only triggered after then if dam levels fall below 70 per cent capacity.
the analysis. Given that in a discounted cashflow framework there is a higher weight placed on costs incurred in the initial periods of the analysis, we would expect that this could have a significant bearing on the costs (in net present value terms) used in the CEA.

2.3 Hunter water supply system performance in drought


**Levelised costs**

One way of expressing costs is through the use of levelised costs. Levelised cost looks at the cost of producing a unit of water under each measure. It converts the present value of a series of costs into an equivalent annual series of payments. In its calculations Aurecon calculates levelised cost as the Net Present Value (NPV) of costs divided by the NPV of additional yield produced by that supply option.

The concept of levelised cost has typically been used in the past where the benefits of particular options cannot be readily monetised. Therefore, the benefits are presented in terms of their contribution to an additional volume of water. So, for example, demand management programs have been evaluated according to the cost of the program per unit of water saved. In this instance, the use of levelised costs is likely to
be more relevant because there is a direct relationship between the amount of money spent on a program and estimated water savings.

While the use of levelised costs can be a simple way of comparing options, it can be misleading because it usually does not adequately account for future changes in costs and quantities of water conserved. The use of levelised cost assumes that the marginal value of water remain constant into the future, which is often not the case.

In Aurecon’s calculation of levelised cost it is assumed that the desalination plant is operating at full capacity. Therefore, it appears that even if there is excess supply in the initial years the desalination plant is assumed to be operating at full capacity. This would make the desalination plant a very expensive option because it is producing water even when it is not needed.

The use of levelised costs has been heavily criticised in assessing large regional infrastructure options. For example, Marsden Jacob Associates 2007, noted that ‘levelised cost does not demonstrate the net change in costs of supplying water to the region under various options’. This study also noted another shortcoming of the levelised cost approach is that it lacks transparency when conducting triple-bottom-line assessments.

The use of levelised costs in Sydney’s 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan was also criticised. As a result, the 2006 Plan moved away from the concept of project specific levelised cost and noted that it was crucial that costs and benefits be assessed at the portfolio level. This is due to the fact that individual project level costs and benefits could be misleading. The analysis supporting Sydney’s upcoming 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan also does not use the concept of levelised costs of individual options.
3 The economic model

In order to assess the alternative options an economic model was developed by Hunter Water and Aurecon based on the analytical framework discussed above. The economic model developed incorporates a breakdown of costs for each of the portfolios considered, and includes a wide range of assumptions regarding inputs. The economic model uses a discounted cashflow analysis. The decision rule is to choose the option that has the lowest net present value of all future capital and operating costs, which has been converted into an equivalent levelised cost.

This section comments on the robustness of the economic model to undertake the CEA and the underlying assumptions used in the modelling.

Options analysed in the economic model

Hunter Water and Aurecon have considered seven mutually exclusive options in its analysis. However, policy makers have a wide range of other decision tools available that could be considered in alternative portfolios, including:

- providing smaller scale investments to increase supply combined with additional demand-side measures;
- changing the restrictions regime which may mean changing the duration, frequency and severity of restrictions;
- operating the existing assets in different ways under different circumstances (this is particularly relevant if a desalination plant were constructed); and
- developing ‘readiness’ strategies to deal with unforeseen circumstances. These could include, for example, purchasing land (or key pieces of equipment) in advance in preparation for the need to construct an additional desalination plant.

All of these choices have their place in the toolkit of policy options. The key decision is to consider:

- which measure or combination of measures to use; and
- when to introduce the measures and in what sequence.

In our view, the CEA could usefully have considered a wider range of combinations of measures. These could include, for example, more flexible use of water restrictions, and different timing of the capital expenditure which includes triggering new capital expenditure based on a storage level rather than a point in time.
We believe that the investments under the DMP should be considered as a separate portfolio of options. That is, a new desalination plant being triggered if storage levels reached 70 per cent of total storage capacity as envisaged in the DMP. It would be useful to also consider other options related to the desalination plant such as:

- adopting a lower dam level for triggering the desalination plant investment such as 60 per cent and 50 per cent. This could be combined with having harsher quantitative water restrictions to reduce storage depletion rates;
- incorporating a relatively small desalination facility that has the flexibility to upscale at lower dam levels if this occurred; and
- allowing a desalination plant to be operated based on dam trigger levels such as only switching the plant on when dam levels reach 70 per cent. This could result in substantially lower operating costs compared with operating a plant at full capacity, particularly where the distribution of storage levels is skewed toward higher levels.

It is possible that there are alternative portfolios that involve, for example, higher levels of restrictions combined with a new desalination plant (constructed at relatively low dam levels) may deliver lower cost outcomes than the Dam. However, this would require further detailed modelling by Hunter Water.

**Timing of expenditure in the model**

The timing of expenditure in a discounted cashflow model has a very large impact on the results. The assumptions regarding the construction period and the period before each option can deliver full supply are transparent in the Aurecon model. In Aurecon’s model the capital expenditure enters the model in the year in which it is incurred. The timing of when new capital expenditure is required is based on the specified assumptions that require all options to be fully operational by around 2013.

In the economic model, when new investment is triggered the capital costs are assumed to be distributed evenly over a specified construction period for the supply source. These assumptions are transparently provided in the economic model.

---

13 It is important that the costs are weighted to take account of the probability of triggering the investment. Hunter Water has adopted this approach in its revised modelling (appendix D). Further, the chance of triggering the investment would differ over time as the demand changes. It is also important to consider this in the discounted cashflow analysis.

14 In the analysis a discount rate of 7 per cent is assumed with sensitivity testing of 4 and 10 per cent. This is standard practice as required by NSW Treasury Guidelines.

15 These are also presented in table 6 in Working Paper G of the EAR.
It would be useful for Hunter Water to consider alternative timing of the investment option, given that the options appear to deliver significant excess capacity in initial years and a supply–demand balance is reached in the outer period of the planning horizon.

Changing the assumptions regarding the construction period can have a significant impact on the present value of the costs. The extent to which future technological advancements can reduce the lead time of projects will substantially reduce the present value of costs. This highlights the value of portfolios that are flexible and allow policy makers to delay large infrastructure expenditure in response to new information that may arise in the future.

As noted above, Hunter Water could usefully consider additional portfolios of options with different assumptions regarding the timing of the expenditure. An obvious portfolio to consider is a portfolio based on the DMP where the construction of a desalination plant is triggered once storage levels fall below 70 per cent of capacity. In its revised modelling discussed in appendix D, Hunter Water has undertaken this additional analysis, with different probabilities of triggering the desalination plant in each year.

**The magnitude of the costs**

The magnitude of the cost items assumed in the CEA will have an impact on the ranking of the different options. These cost items will not be known with certainty and reasonable estimates will need to be made to be included in the 50 year cashflow analysis. We are not in a position to comment in detail about the cost assumptions included in the analysis. This requires detailed site specific analysis by suitably qualified engineers.

While we are not able to comment in detail about the specific items, we offer some observations regarding the costs related to the desalination plant.

In the options analysis presented in the EAR the costs (in real 2008-09 dollars) related to the desalination plant are estimated to be $990 million in capital expenditure and $26.63 million in operating costs. This is based on a plant of 125ML per day and operating costs of approximately 60 cents per kL.\(^ {16} \) Hunter Water assumes that the desalination plant will be operating at full capacity.

We note that in the H250 Plan (Hunter Water Corporation, 2008, p. 89) Hunter Water considered a 70 ML per day desalination plant with a capital cost of $500 million per annum (including $50 million to mitigate high energy requirements) and annual

\(^{16} \) This is presented in table 3.1 in the EAR, p. 3.15.
operating cost of $25 million per year.\textsuperscript{17} It is not clear why the annual operating costs of the 70 ML per day plant presented in the H\textsubscript{2}50 Plan are equivalent to the operating costs of the much larger plant considered in the EAR. Using a figure of 60 cents per kL this equates to approximately $15 million per annum in operating costs. It would be useful for Hunter Water to clarify the assumed operating costs for a 70 ML per day plant.

Further, it is not clear to us how the capital costs for the Dam and desalination plant have been derived. Section 4.4.4 in Working Paper G of the EAR indicates that the capital costs relating to the desalination plant were increased commensurate with an increase in the capacity of the plant. The larger plant was expected to cost $688 million in 2006-07 dollars and this has been converted to $989 million in 2008-09 dollars. This equates to a 44 per cent increase in costs over a two year period. This does not appear to bear any relationship with either the consumer price index (CPI) or construction cost index. Similarly, the capital cost of the Dam was estimated at $300 million in 2006-07 dollars and converted to $397 million in 2008-09 dollars — a 32 per cent increase. It would useful for Hunter Water to review these cost estimates and to advise on whether these cost items are correctly reported.\textsuperscript{18}

The nature of the operating costs for the desalination plant is more complex compared with the capital costs. The variable operating costs are the largest component of the total operating costs. There are also standby, shut-down and start-up costs depending on how the plant is operated. As a comparison, Sydney Water’s factsheet on the desalination plant indicate that total operating costs of 80 cents per kL are anticipated when the plant is running at full capacity. This incorporates the costs of renewable energy certificates to offset the greenhouse gas emissions.\textsuperscript{19} This also includes fixed operating costs of the plant.

Hunter Water’s assumption of 60 cents per kL appears to be within the same ‘ballpark’ as Sydney Water’s assumed cost of operating the desalination plant. Nevertheless it would be useful for Hunter Water to provide more information regarding its assumed costs associated with the desalination plant including the following.

* Assumptions regarding whether the capital costs:
  - include the costs related to the pipeline as well;
  - include activities to reduce the energy use of the desalination plant; and

\textsuperscript{17} A larger 120 ML per day plant is anticipated as a drought contingency response (Hunter Water Corporation 2008, p. 89, H250 Plan).

\textsuperscript{18} Hunter Water has presented additional information to clarify its costs. This information is discussed further in appendix D.

\textsuperscript{19} This is based on the plant capacity of 250 ML per day, resulting in annual operating costs of approximately $75 million per annum.
incorporate the costs associated with purchasing land.

Assumptions regarding the operating costs:
- what is the assumed electricity consumption (MWh per ML) of the plant and the pumping station?;
- what is the assumed purchase price of electricity ($ per MWh)?; and
- do the costs incorporate any costs related to the purchase of ‘green energy’ and other costs that seek to offset the greenhouse gas emissions?

This information would allow readers to gain a greater understanding of the cost items. For example, it appears that the assumed costs related to the desalination plant incorporate the cost of water filtration and the cost of ‘green energy’. It appears that these cost items are not included in the costs associated with Tillegra Dam.

As noted above, it is particularly important to understand the operating rule for the desalination plant in the context of a system with highly volatile rainfall patterns such as in the lower Hunter region. This is not a simple exercise as it is a complex balance between allowing for sufficient ‘headroom’ to capture the high inflow events, but allowing dam levels not to fall to such levels as to pose a risk to security. In the case of Sydney Water’s desalination plant, detailed economic analysis was conducted to determine the optimal operating rule. The optimal operating rules for a desalination plant in Hunter Water’s region may be different to Sydney Water’s as it depends on a wide range of factors including the hydrological characteristics of the catchment, the size of the existing storages and the size of the desalination plant considered.

It is also important to recognise that the operating rule for a desalination plant needs to be developed in the context of the portfolio of existing measures. If for example, new demand management measures or harsher quantitative water restrictions were introduced this would also influence the way in which the desalination plant is operated because it may mean that storage levels can be allowed to fall to, for example, below 50 per cent before the desalination plants begins producing water. As demand increases into the future, it may be optimal to commence operating the plant at higher storage levels.

We believe that Hunter Water needs to undertake further detailed modelling regarding the cost impacts of alternative operating regimes for a desalination plant.

---


21 In Hunter Water’s revised modeling discussed in appendix D it has compared the costs of the desalination plant option using two scenarios regarding the operating costs — firstly, if the costs were zero and secondly if the plant was operating at full capacity.
Costs excluded from the model

The economic model developed by Hunter Water and Aurecon incorporates the direct financial costs to the utility associated with the particular option and the timing of when these costs are incurred. There are a range of cost items that have not been included in the modelling.

Environmental and social costs

Typically a detailed economic analysis of alternative infrastructure options should incorporate the full range of costs associated with the portfolio. Apart from the direct capital and operating costs, there are also likely to be a range of indirect costs that need to be incorporated into the analysis. If the full range of costs are not included in the analysis it may distort the results.

One of the key gaps in the CEA is the exclusion of environmental and social impacts. These issues are left to the initial qualitative examination by Hunter Water. As noted previously, we have concerns regarding the robustness of the qualitative analysis undertaken to consider the environmental and social costs. In particular, the analysis presented in the matrix does not inform the reader on issues such as:

- the magnitude of these impacts;
- whether they occur frequently or only in drought periods; and
- whether they lead to irreversible damage or whether these impacts can be managed and, if so, what are the costs of doing so.

Currently it is very difficult to consider how the financial costs and water security/reliability outcomes of different options compares against the environmental and social impacts of the options.

Exclusion of cost of water restrictions

Another key factor that is not included in the analysis is the costs associated with water restrictions. The analysis on the impacts of water security and reliability on the community (conducted in various jurisdictions in Australia) indicates that there is a cost associated with restrictions.

In Hunter Water’s framework all options considered are required to meet minimum service levels in regards to security and reliability. However, the options may differ

---

22 This is not intended to be an exhaustive list but provides some indication of the types of issues that would need to be considered in examining the potential tradeoffs between the financial costs and water security/reliability outcomes.

23 Recent studies in Australia relating to the cost of water restrictions are presented in appendix B.
in the level of service provided above the minimum level. In particular, it is possible that, for example, the desalination plant option will result in less time in restrictions compared with those options that are rainfall dependent because it provides a less variable supply of water. Given that the costs of water restrictions are significant, it is possible that this may change the ranking of the portfolios — depending on the magnitude of the cost of restrictions and the differences in the level of service provided, the desalination portfolio is likely to be higher.

In order to calculate the optimal level of service to the community (in terms of providing a more reliable and secure water supply), the costs of water restrictions need to be incorporated into the analysis. This view has been supported strongly by the Water Services Association of Australia (WSAA) which released a paper that outlined an approach to calculating the optimal level of water security.24

We believe that Hunter Water needs to incorporate this cost item into its analysis to ensure that there is a more comprehensive consideration of all cost items.

Economywide effects of the Dam

As part of the assessment of the Tillegra Dam, modelling has been undertaken by the Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS) to assess the potential economywide impacts of the construction of the dam and the impacts on economic activity from the additional supply provided by the Dam. A CGE model is used to assess the impacts.

CGE modelling is a tool used to provide an understanding of the potential flow-on impacts throughout the economy. In simple terms, the CGE models provide an understanding of the net economic benefits resulting from shifting resources toward the construction of the dam and away from other productive activities in the economy. The net welfare gains will be dependent on a range of factors such as assumptions regarding the:

- time period before the Dam begins to provide water for the economy; and
- importance of improving water security in the Hunter region to the economy.

The role of CGE modelling in the analysis of options

The use of CGE modelling as a sole tool for evaluating alternative options has been criticised in submissions to the review. In particular, Professor Wells notes that the CGE modelling is not the right tool for examining the net welfare gains under the different options. For example, Professor Wells’ notes one of the limitations (amongst others) is that the CGE modelling only considers direct market impacts and does not typically consider non-market factors.

24 Erlanger and Neal 2005.
We support Professor Wells’ view that a CGE modelling does not by itself provide a complete approach to considering the net social welfare impacts of alternative options. Hunter Water also recognises that the CGE modelling was not used as part of the options analysis and was only seeking to provide an indication of the potential economywide impacts of the Dam. In email correspondence, Hunter Water noted that:

The CGE model simply describes the flow on effects of the economic stimulus from the project should it be approved including increases in financial aspects of the economy and likely changes to employment. Understanding these consequential positive impacts are ancillary to selecting the project which has the least cost and/or the best or least environmental outcomes. CGE modelling is therefore arguably not a project option assessment tool and whilst it helps characterise the effects of the proposal, should it be approved, the results of the CGE model should never be considered in isolation to the broader assessment.

In its EAR, the primary tool for examining the options is the CEA, however, Aurecon states that the:

CEA should not be considered in isolation from other elements reported upon in the EA Report. Other non-financial factors have been subject to qualitative analysis which is complemented by CGE modelling of the impacts on the region.

Given that the CEA undertaken only focuses on the direct financial costs of the different options, we support the need to consider a wide range of other information to take account of the indirect impacts in order to allow a ‘full’ comparison of the different options. However, given that the CGE modelling was only undertaken in relation to Tillegra Dam it does not provide additional information to assist policy makers to decide between the different options available. At best it provides information to suggest that the construction of the Dam will have net economic benefits under certain assumptions. The next section provides a critique of some of the assumptions in the CGE modelling presented in Working Paper G of the report.

Review of the modelling assumptions

The CGE modelling does not appear to use Hunter Water’s demand projections. Instead the modelling assumes that the output of water and drainage sector will increase by 50 per cent from 2015 onwards, thereby significantly increasing the demand for water. The 50 per cent increase in the sectoral output was equivalent to

---

25 It is worth noting the CGE analysis can, in many cases, provide an important input into benefit cost analysis. For example, CGE models can provide a good understanding of the broad economic effects of water restrictions and other water shortages. However, the CGE analysis has not be used in this way by Hunter Water.

26 Email from Hunter Water to NSW Department of Planning, 1 June 2010.


a water yield increase of 72 per cent from 72 GL to 125 GL. This significant level of increase in economic activity from 2015 onwards appears to be inconsistent to Hunter Water’s demand projections.

It is not clear why the CGE analysis has been structured in this way. In our view, the simulation should be about understanding the impact of increasing the supply of water (from the Dam) to meet the underlying demand for water. This would be a more realistic approach given that Hunter Water’s demand projections have already incorporated assumptions regarding the increases in economic activity in the region. Further, given that the economic activity in the region is currently not constrained by water scarcity (and is not likely to be constrained for some time) the assumption that an additional 72 GL of water is required to meet demand from 2015 onwards would appear unrealistic. This is particularly true given that water prices are currently regulated by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW (IPART) and do not reflect the scarcity of water. For example, in periods of low water availability, prices do not rise to reflect the scarcity value of water which would be expected if the price of water was not regulated.

Further, the EAR also recognises that the construction of the Dam will result in significant excess capacity for the next 30 years. The following chart, which is reproduced from the Working Paper G highlights this point.

The chart is based on Hunter Water’s high demand projections. According to the high demand projection, in 2015 the demand for water in the lower Hunter Valley region will be only 85.8 GL. As a result, 39.2 GL of the annual water yield of the Dam will not be required. The full amount of the annual yield of 125 GL will not be required until 2048. If these high demand projections do not eventuate there will be excess capacity for a longer period of time.

The following table compares the CGE modelling assumption of an increase in water and drainage output (CoPS 2008, table 2) against the likely increase calculated using the formula in footnote 1 of CoPS (2008) with the assumption of the high demand projection in Working Paper G (Aurecon 2009). Based on this we conclude that the economic impact of the Tillegra Dam is likely to be overstated by 270 per cent in 2015 to 56 per cent in 2031.
3.1 Water supply and demand

Data source: Working Paper G (p. 4.11, appendix A).

3.2 Likely over stated benefit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CGE modeling assumption</th>
<th>Likely increase assuming high demand projection</th>
<th>Likely overstated impact by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2028</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2029</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2031</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Likely increase in water and drainage sectoral output is estimated assuming high demand projection in Working Paper G (Aurecon 2009).
Source: The CIE.

A further assumption that is likely to overestimate the net benefits from the Dam relates to the calculation of the water and drainage sectoral output shock explained
in footnote 1 of CoPS (2008). It was assumed that all capital in the sector is for water. This assumption is unlikely to be justified — at least some capital in the sector is for drainage. In correcting this assumption, the shocks and thus the impact would be even smaller.

Some other issues of clarity (rather than substance) regarding the CGE modelling undertaken are listed below.

- It is assumed that the construction of Dam will be completed in 2014 and the Dam will produce full yield in 2015. Is this realistic?
- In explaining the negative impact on welfare in the lower Hunter Valley in 2014, CoPS (2008, p. 4) states, ‘within the model, idle capital contributes to a technological deterioration, which reduces both real disposable income and aggregation consumption in the lower Hunter Valley in 2014 relative to forecast’. Some further explanation of this mechanism would be useful to understand the model results.
- It is hard to understand why sectors like education and health and community services in the lower Hunter Valley suffer (CoPS 2008, p. 10, table 2), given that the region will have more people moving in due to a boost in economic activity and employment.
- It is not clear why baseline macro growth assumptions (CoPS 2008, p. 14) have dips between 2014 and 2017. For example, aggregate investment growth in the lower Hunter Valley and the rest of Australia falls below zero.
- Inconsistent statement of current water supply: it is 67 GL in chapter 12 (p. 12.12) and Working Paper G (p. 5.2), while 72 GL in CoPS (2008, p. 2.3).
- Inconsistent statement of present value of welfare gain from the Dam: 2.3 billion in chapter 12 (p. 12.16) and Working Paper G (p. 5.6), but 3 000 million in CoPS (2008, p. 2.12).

While we present comments regarding the CGE modelling undertaken by CoPS we believe that it is not worth seeking greater clarification of the assumptions used in the modelling. Given that the CGE modelling is a secondary tool and does not form part of the options analysis, gaining greater clarity of the assumptions used in the CGE modelling would not assist in understanding whether the Dam is considered to be a better option than other options analysed.

**Sensitivity testing**

Sensitivity testing is an important part of any economic analysis (whether it be a CEA or more comprehensive BCA) because the analysis requires placing estimates on a large number of ‘inputs’ into economic model. Therefore, assumptions are required to be made in regards to these estimates. The purpose of the sensitivity testing is to understand how changing the assumption used in the CEA can change the results of
the analysis. This is important given that there often not consensus on some of the assumptions used. For example, there is likely to be some range of ‘reasonableness’ for assumptions, rather than a single parameter. The sensitivity testing helps to understand how important these assumptions are in influencing the results of the analysis and whether changing the assumptions can change the ranking of alternative options considered.

In the CEA presented in the EAR, a range of sensitivity tests have been undertaken including:

- changes to the discount rate, with rates of 4 per cent and 10 per cent (real) also being considered;
- a 50 per cent increase in capital costs and (separately) for operating costs; and
- high and low demand forecasts.29

The sensitivity testing conducted in the CEA provides some useful additional information. However, the most important issue regarding the uncertain impact of different climatic scenarios is omitted. In our view, this should be one of the key elements of the sensitivity analysis given that this is likely to be a key feature that helps policy makers distinguish between the Dam and alternative options being considered.

It is useful to consider the impact of alternative climatic scenarios that includes other expected characteristics of climate change, including a reduction in average inflows, increased volatility of inflows, longer duration of droughts and changing rainfall/runoff characteristics of the catchment. These changes could result in more severe water shortage issues than, for example, a 10 per cent reduction in average rainfall would suggest. Given the significant investment being considered we believe that the CEA needs to be expanded significantly to consider these issues.

It would also be useful to test the impact of lower operating costs has on the results. This is particularly important for the desalination facilities which are relatively energy intensive and where technological advancements are expected to reduce the energy needs of desalination facilities in the future.

While it is useful to conduct sensitivity testing by changing a single parameter at a time, it is also useful to consider changes in more than one parameter at a time. This is particularly important where there are ‘correlated risks’ such as the climate change having an impact on the supply side but also on the demand side (if, for example, hot and dry conditions result in higher demand). This would be particularly important for those options that are considered that are rainfall dependent sources of supply.

29 These are presented in section 4.5 of Working Paper G.
4 Conclusions

The approach that Hunter Water has adopted in its initial assessment of the different options is consistent with past approaches that have been traditionally utilised to assess alternative water supply options, where there was reliance primarily on rain-fed sources of water that were required to be constructed with long lead times.

There have been numerous advances in the methodological approaches adopted over the past few years that overcome some of the limitations of the more ‘traditional’ approach, particularly when evaluating new sources of supply such as desalination facilities. An example of this is the changes to the approach adopted in Sydney to evaluate alternative options since the 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan. In particular, there have been significant changes in the approach adopted for the 2006 Plan and this approach has been further refined for the 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan. Some of the changes compared with the 2004 approach include:

- the adaptive management framework that places greater emphasis on the flexibility of systems and the value of deferring decisions to take account of new information as it develops;
- moving towards portfolio analysis and away from analysis of individual options;
- moving away from levelised cost and toward whole-of-life costs;
- moving away from the use of system yield and to explicitly recognise the costs of quantitative water restrictions;
- more complex incorporation of risk and uncertainty into the evaluation framework; and
- detailed scenario analysis that presents the security and reliability performance of alternatives.

In response to Hunter Water and Aurecon’s initial assessment of the different options, in our draft report we considered that there were significant gaps in the methodological approach adopted. Given these limitations we did not consider that the analysis demonstrated the conclusion that the Dam was the best option to meet the future water supply needs of Hunter Water. We recommended that additional information and modelling was required to determine whether the Dam (or an alternative) was the ‘optimal’ solution. Attachment C provides a summary of the key steps that we suggested (in our draft report) was required to assist NSW Planning to reach its conclusions regarding the merits of the Dam compared with other options.
In its response to our draft report Hunter Water has provided additional information regarding the costs of the desalination plant and the Dam options. It has also presented additional modelling which takes on-board some of the gaps that we identified in our draft report. The revised modelling undertaken by Hunter Water compares two options, the Dam (combined with the DMP) and a desalination plant option that is based on a 70 per cent trigger level.

We have reviewed the additional cost information presented by Hunter Water and the revised modelling that it conducted. This review is presented in appendix D of this report.

In regards to the additional cost information presented by Hunter Water we are not in a position to conduct a detailed site specific analysis which is beyond the scope of our study. Therefore, our review of the cost information was necessarily broad and largely focused on the reasonableness of the assumptions adopted. In this regards, we conclude that the process for deriving the cost estimates for the Dam and factors used for escalating the costs to 2008-09 dollars appear broadly reasonable.

However, we have noted a number of concerns regarding the cost estimates relating to the desalination plant option. The cost estimates for the desalination plant were originally based on estimates provided by GHD. More recently Hunter Water has revised the original estimates using some assumptions that are significantly different to those adopted by GHD. Hunter Water’s revised assumptions may be reasonable, however, we believe that further testing is required given the significant differences to the assumptions used by GHD.

In regards to the revised modelling conducted by Hunter Water, our review identified a number of gaps in this analysis. In particular the revised analysis adopts different assumptions regarding the security of supply of the Dam compared with the alternative desalination plant option examined. More specifically, for the analysis of the Dam option, Hunter Water has assumed that the DMP is suspended over the first six years of the analysis period. As a result, if a ‘bad’ drought was to occur during this period then the security of supply may be compromised.

However, under the alternative option presented in the revised modelling, if a bad drought occurred in the first 6 years then a desalination plant would be triggered once dam levels reached 70 per cent. As a result, it would appear that this would provide a much greater level of security during a ‘bad’ drought compared with the Dam option examined.

It is important to understand that Hunter Water’s assumption regarding the suspension of the DMP for the Dam option also has cost implications. More specifically, this assumption results in a lower cost for the Dam although this comes at the expense of security of supply. Hunter Water has not provided any information regarding the security of supply implications for the options examined in its revised
modelling. This makes it difficult to examine the tradeoffs between security of supply and the cost.

Based on our calculations (using Hunter Water’s revised modelling), if the DMP was assumed to be in operation from the first year of the analysis then the cost of the Dam would be greater than the cost of the desalination plant option examined. That is, if similar assumptions were adopted for all options analysed regarding the security of supply it would appear that the desalination plant option examined could result in a greater improvement in net social welfare compared with the Dam.

It is not clear to us that (on the evidence presented by Hunter Water) that the Dam is superior to the desalination plant option considered. Further, Hunter Water has not examined a wide range of potential portfolios using a robust methodology that would give us confidence that that there has been a robust assessment of all available options.

It is important to note that while we do not believe that the evidence presented clearly supports the case for the Dam, without undertaking detailed modelling we are not in a position to comment on whether alternative options are superior to the Dam. Nevertheless, based on the information provided to us, it would appear that a desalination plant option could be superior to the Dam (once risk is adequately incorporated into the analysis). However, it is beyond the scope of our study to conduct the analysis to confirm whether or not this is the case.

Key findings

4.1 Key findings

In essence, our key findings from this review can be summarised as follows.

- In effect, the methodology adopted by Hunter Water does not allow the alternative options to be compared on the same basis. This is because:
  - the different options have different risk characteristics that are not captured in the analysis; and
  - the different options have different types of benefits, again not captured in the analysis.

- Further, Hunter Water’s analysis is only limited to a small range of options. There are additional options that could be considered (particularly in terms of timing and portfolios of options) in examining future water supplies. A more thorough examination of options and presentation of this information is required.

- Because of these points, we do not consider that the analysis undertaken to date by Hunter Water fully demonstrates that the Dam is the best option to meet the long term water supply needs of the region.
Way forward

In order to assist NSW Planning to reach its conclusions we recommend that further action is required. These are summarised in the box below.

4.2 Recommended further action

**Step 1.** Further examination of Hunter Water’s cost assumptions for the desalination plant. NSW Planning should test some of the assumptions used by Hunter Water to calculate the following cost items:
- contractor’s direct and indirect oncost;
- construction management costs; and
- construction contingency items.

**Step 2.** Hunter Water to undertake a revised CEA approach similar to the framework used to develop the 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan for Sydney. This should include a detailed consideration of a range of different portfolios that incorporated the construction of the desalination facilities at different storage trigger levels. It is important to present both the implication for costs as well as the implication for security of supply.

**Step 3.** In tandem with Step 2, Hunter Water should gather more detailed information about the range of environmental and social impacts of the alternative portfolios considered. This should provide decision makers with additional information such as:
- the range of potential impacts;
- the relative importance of the impacts to each other;
- the magnitude of the impacts; and
- whether the magnitude of the impacts changes under alternative climate scenarios.

Step 2 would provide more detailed information that would allow decision makers to consider the ranking of portfolios on cost and security grounds. Step 3 would provide further information to understand whether incorporating information on environmental and social impacts would change the rankings from Step 2. A full BCA should also be considered where there is robust information available. However, the extent to which this is required would depend on the findings in Steps 2 and 3 above.
Appendixes
## A The cost of water restrictions

A summary of some recent studies that have sought to provide a measure of the cost of water restrictions to the residential sector are presented in this section. It is important to recognise that while restrictions have a cost they are still an important measure that should be considered as part of the portfolio of options available to meet water supply needs of a community.

### Queensland

The Queensland Water QWI has previously undertaken two studies to examine the cost of water restrictions to residential customers in South-East Queensland (SEQ):

- The Allen Consulting Group (2007) to understand the willingness to pay for increased reliability in the SEQ region. The study used a Contingent Valuation method to estimate households’ willingness to pay for increased water security for residential use.
- DBM Consulting (2007) to estimate the economic benefits to the community of improvements in water security in SEQ. A choice modelling study was used to assess the community’s willingness to pay for increased water supply reliability in SEQ.

### The Allen Consulting Group

The findings of the Allen Consulting Group (2007) are presented in the chart below. They found that households were willing to pay higher amounts for higher levels of reliability. For example, households were willing to pay an additional $132 per annum to reduce the frequency of Level 4 restrictions from 50 per cent of the time to 20 per cent of the time. Households were willing to pay an additional $190 per annum to remove the need for Level 2 (or worse) restrictions.

### DBM Consultants

In undertaking its study on the willingness to pay for increased reliability of supply DBM Consultants (2007) separated the community into five separate household groups. ‘Conservationists’ were found to have the lowest willingness to pay ($2 per annum) to increase water supply reliability from Level 4 water restrictions 1 in every 4 years with a duration of 24 months to restrictions 1 in every 30 years with 12 months duration. The highest willingness to pay for this same change was with
the ‘Devoted Gardeners’ who were willing to pay $270 per annum. The average across all groups was $134 per household per annum. For the highest set of water security outcomes considered in the study (Level 4 restrictions 1 in 100 years, duration 6 months, mostly green public parks) the average willingness to pay was $174 per annum per household.

Other jurisdictions

Throughout Australia there have been a limited number of studies that have sought to estimate the costs of water restrictions through the use of willingness to pay studies.  

- Henscher et al. (2006) used a choice modelling approach in Canberra in 2002 and 2003 to calculate the marginal willingness to pay to avoid drought induced restrictions. They estimated the cost of restrictions at $239 per household per year for relatively severe restrictions.

- Gordon et al. (2001) also conducted a choice modelling survey of Canberra households in the late 1990s to compare alternative demand and supply options to water scarcity. The results suggested that residents were willing to pay, on average, a small amount ($10 in 1997 dollars) to prevent a 10 per cent reduction in water use.

- Brennan et al. (2007) calculated the welfare costs in water restrictions in Perth using a household production function and experimental studies to develop a

---

30 We also understand that a study on the willingness to pay for reliability of supply is also currently being undertaken in Victoria, although these results have not been published as yet.
model to examine how bans on the use of sprinklers impacted on the amount of time that households had to spend watering from buckets or using hand-held hoses.

There is difficulty in comparing the findings from other jurisdictions to the Hunter region. For example, the hydrology in the lower Hunter is significantly different to that in Canberra or Perth. This influences the frequency, severity and duration of water restrictions in each area. Further, the demographic profile of particular areas can also impact on the costs to households of restrictions. The residential housing stock may also differ between regions — for example, if there are a significant number of new suburban sub-divisions in the area, households may place a higher value on having less water restrictions to ensure that their new gardens can be established.

However, these studies can be used as a ‘sense check’ on the upper bound of costs. As noted above, for the ACT, the most recent estimate is that the cost of restrictions is $239 per household per year for relatively severe restrictions in 2002-03. The cost of restrictions is expected to be higher for the ACT because it experiences much less rainfall compared with the lower Hunter region (particularly coastal areas). Therefore there is a greater need for outdoor water use, such as watering of gardens and lawns. Without the ability to apply water, gardens can more readily deteriorate and not recover.

However, if the lower Hunter and Central Coast are considered to be growth regions it can be expected that there is likely to be new housing established over the planning period. Typically, new homes will require a greater volume of water to assist gardens to get established. Therefore, it can be anticipated that these households are likely to pay a greater amount to avoid water restrictions that may curtail their outdoor water use.
B Calculation of reliable yield

The supply side is calculated by using the concept of reliable yield. The yield represents the long term average supply that can be expected from the system subject to meeting minimum levels of service. The level of service in this instance relates to the expected reliability and security of the system.

Hunter Water’s definition of yield is,

Yield is the amount of water that can be supplied such that the system does not enter restrictions more often that once per 10 years, is not in restrictions more than 5 per cent of months and such that the risk of reaching the ‘48 month’ trigger in the Drought Management Plan does not exceed 1 in 100. These quantities shall be assessed using headworks simulation models.31

The premise of Hunter Water’s calculation of yield is that the damage to the community and economy of running out of water is so great such that the community would not tolerate it. Hunter Water has adopted an approach which specifies that there is no chance of running out of water. This zero tolerance was incorporated into the system performance.

There are several points to note about the concept of yield.

- It is a long term average and there may be significant differences in reliability between different options, although all options may meet the minimum level of service. This is particularly relevant when comparing desalination facilities with other supply sources that are reliant on rainfall. It is important to understand the extent to which options exceed the minimum standards set.

- The concept of yield does not account for the higher level of volatility of supply associated with rain-fed sources of water. Typically, when examining alternative investment options, both the risk and return characteristics need to be considered. Options that deliver the same return (on average) could have substantially different risk profiles. Given that the planners and the community are more likely to be risk-averse, options that deliver the same mean but low variability are likely to be favoured over more volatile options.

- Yield does not provide information to inform the timing of the decision to implement new measures. For example, there may currently be a supply–demand

31 Hunter Water Corporation 2007, p. 15.
imbalance but storage levels could be at full capacity. Therefore, the concept of yield only takes a long term outlook and needs to be supplemented with additional ‘short term’ information.
C ‘Next steps' identified in draft report

This appendix summarises the ‘next steps’ that we suggested were required for NSW Planning reach its conclusions regarding the merits of the Dam compared with other options. Hunter Water has responded to a number of these suggestions in its response to our draft report.

- **Step 1.** Hunter Water should provide NSW Planning with more detailed information on some of the cost items noted in this report so as to provide decision makers with greater clarity on whether all items have been incorporated to allow a like-for-like comparison. For example, greater clarity is needed on whether the:
  - operating costs related to the desalination plant include the cost of filtration and pumping and whether similar costs have been incorporated in the other options;
  - operating costs of the desalination plant assumes the purchase of green energy and whether similar assumptions have been made for the electricity requirements of other options;
  - capital costs of the desalination plant have been correctly inflated and whether these include the costs of related capital expenditure such as pipelines and pumping stations; and
  - capital costs of the Dam include all the cost items that have been discussed in the EAR such as mitigation measures and additional pipelines or pumping stations.

- **Step 2.** We would recommend that Hunter Water should adopt a revised CEA approach similar to the framework used in the recent development of the (upcoming) 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan for Sydney and for the development of the operating rules for Sydney’s desalination plant. This would also include a detailed consideration of a range of different portfolios that incorporated the construction of the desalination facilities at different trigger levels rather than at a fixed point in time. We would anticipate that this analysis could be largely undertaken with existing information and could be readily undertaken by Hunter Water without external assistance.

- **Step 3.** In tandem with Step 2, Hunter Water should gather more detailed information about the range of environmental and social impacts of the
alternative portfolios considered. This should provide decision makers with additional information such as:

- the range of potential impacts;
- the relative importance of the impacts to each other;
- the magnitude of the impacts; and
- whether the magnitude of the impacts changes under alternative climate scenarios.
D Hunter Water’s response to the draft report

NSW Planning has provided Hunter Water with the opportunity to respond to our draft report. A copy of the draft was provided to Hunter Water for comment in early July 2010. On 23 July 2010 Hunter Water provided a detailed response, including some additional modelling of options.

The main body of this report has remained largely unchanged to the draft report provided to Hunter Water in July 2010, except for a number of minor ‘errors of fact’ identified by Hunter Water. Readers can therefore readily review Hunter Water’s response in tandem with the main body of this report.

Hunter Water has undertaken additional modelling and presented the results of this in its response to our draft report. Hunter Water believes that this additional analysis continues to support its view that the Dam is the best option to meet the long term water security objectives of the region.

The purpose of this appendix is primarily to review the additional material presented by Hunter Water and to consider whether this new evidence would change our conclusions in the draft report regarding the merit of the Dam compared with other options.

The additional material provided by Hunter Water includes:

- additional cost information relating to the Dam and the desalination plant option;
- changes to the Drought Management Plan (DMP) which would trigger the desalination plant option more readily;
- revised modelling of the Tillegra dam option against a desalination plant option based on the DMP; and
- further comment on the treatment of environmental and social impacts.

Cost information

In our draft report we suggested that further information be provided by Hunter Water to provide decision makers with greater clarification on whether all cost items have been incorporated into the analysis. Hunter Water has provided:
a spreadsheet showing how the costs of Tillegra Dam have been developed, itemising the different cost elements; and

- a breakup of the different cost elements relating to the desalination plant, including an explanation of how these costs were inflated.

As noted in the main body of the report, we are not in a position to verify whether the costs submitted accurately reflect the cost of constructing the desalination plant and the Dam. This requires detailed site specific analysis which is beyond the scope of our study. Therefore, our comments on the additional cost information provided are restricted to more general observations.

**Desalination plant costs**

In the options analysis presented in the EAR the costs (in real 2008-09 dollars) related to the desalination plant are estimated to be $990 million in capital expenditure based on a 125 ML per day plant.\(^{32}\)

Appendix D in Hunter Water’s response to our draft report explains how this cost was calculated. Firstly, the estimated capital costs were based on a study by GHD titled *Desalination Plant Site Selection Final Report*. Secondly, some cost items were updated for direct comparison with other options in the EA study.

Some of the cost items updated included:

- **Contractor’s direct and indirect oncost.** The original calculation by GHD was based on assumed oncosts of 12 per cent of the estimated prime construction cost. This percentage was later updated by Hunter Water to 35 per cent.\(^{33}\) This change resulted in an increase in the cost of the desalination plant by about $81 million (from $42 million to $123 million).

- **Construction management.** The calculation of this item appears to be based on an assumed proportion of the estimated prime construction cost and the oncosts calculated in the dot point above.\(^{34}\) GHD assumed a 2 per cent factor while Hunter Water has updated this to 5 per cent. The original calculation has therefore increased by $15 million (from $8 million to $23 million).

- **Construction contingency.** This item appears to be based on an assumed percentage of 35 per cent of the sum of the estimated prime construction cost and the items in

---

\(^{32}\) In Hunter Water’s revised options analysis it also includes a cost of $90 million for an emergency borefield that would allow the desalination plant to be triggered when Dam levels reached 70 per cent of storage capacity.

\(^{33}\) Hunter Water indicates that it has ‘arrived at the higher rate after consulting with a number of major construction companies. The rates indicated by these companies were in the range 35% to 39%.’ (email correspondence 27 September 2010).

\(^{34}\) We have not been able to precisely replicate these calculations.
the dot points above. Given that the items in the two dot points above have changed, this also flows through into a $37 million increase in the construction contingency allowance originally estimated by GHD.

Hunter Water has made changes to GHD’s original estimates to ensure consistency with the assumptions used in developing the costs for Tillegra dam. It argues that ‘Tillegra’s estimate was based on a full concept design and a more detailed appreciation for environmental offset commitments’.

While we believe that it is important to have consistency in much of the analysis, it is not clear to us that it need necessarily apply in this instance. The aim in developing the costings is to ensure that the most robust cost estimates of the different options are developed. There may be valid reasons for using different assumptions for similar cost items across different infrastructure types.

Hunter Water’s approach in updating GHD’s initial estimates may be reasonable and consistent with industry practice in developing early stage cost estimates. However, we believe that further testing of these assumptions is required for the following reasons:

- Hunter Water’s changes significantly increase the total cost of the desalination plant relative to GHD’s original estimates;
- the original estimates were independently developed by GHD which has substantial experience in the development of cost estimates. While we accept that GHD’s estimates were not based on a full concept design (unlike Tillegra Dam), one would expect that its assumptions on factors such as oncosts would be relatively accurate. The assumptions adopted by Hunter Water, particularly relating to contractor’s oncosts, are vastly different to GHD’s estimates;
- the assumptions noted above appear to have a compounding impact on each other. For example, the construction contingency fee appears to be based on (amongst other things) the contractor’s oncosts and the construction contingency cost item. Therefore, by changing the assumptions regarding contractor’s oncosts it has ‘multiplier effects’ through the construction contingency fee and the construction management fee. It is worth clarifying whether this is consistent with industry practices for estimating costs of infrastructure projects; and
- we have not been able to exactly replicate Hunter Water’s revised calculations in relation to the three cost items noted above. There appear to be slight differences in the methodology adopted by GHD and Hunter Water in relation to calculating these costs.

In order to progress this issue NSW Planning could compare Hunter Water’s assumptions regarding the cost items noted above to the assumptions adopted for other infrastructure projects that have been submitted to NSW Planning for approval. Alternatively NSW Planning could consult with industry experts to gain a
further understanding of the reasonableness of these assumptions and the method used to calculate these items above.

In regards to the operating costs of the desalination plant, Hunter Water has not provided revised estimates of expected operating costs under alternative operating rules. Instead in its additional analysis (discussed below) Hunter Water adopts two scenarios (one assuming that the desalination plant is operating at full capacity and the other with no operating costs assumed for the desalination plant). This is a reasonable approach to conduct preliminary analysis.

However, we would expect that a more comprehensive analysis should be conducted, particularly given that alternative operating rules have implications for both the cost and security of supply.

**Tillegra Dam**

As noted in the draft report, we questioned the escalation factor used to convert the capital cost of the Dam in 2006-07 dollars to 2008-09 dollars. We suggested that it would be useful to obtain further information on the individual items that were used to develop the cost estimates for Tillegra Dam. Hunter Water has provided this in the form of a detailed spreadsheet. Hunter Water has also indicated that “one problem with the range of option estimates was they were compiled by a variety of different consultants at different times”.

Hunter Water’s spreadsheet indicates that the capital cost of the Dam is estimated at $399 million (in real 2006 dollars) which includes the initial land purchases and construction related costs. Hunter Water has indicated that initially more land than that required was purchased and an allowance has been made in the budget for the resale of excess land. Hunter Water has, therefore, reduced the cost of the Dam by $32 million to reflect the allowance for the resale of excess land resulting in a net cost of $365 million (in real 2006 dollars). This is reasonable, given that the cost-effectiveness analysis undertaken by Hunter Water needs to reflect the actual cost of the land that will be used.

In its options analysis Hunter Water has utilised a figure of $397 million to reflect the cost of the Dam in 2008-09 dollars. This is based on the estimate of $365 million (in real 2006 dollars) and adjusting for inflation using escalation factors providing by BIS Shrapnel. This approach is reasonable and the revised costs appear to be broadly in line with estimates of inflation.

This is equivalent to $397 million in 2008-09 dollars, using escalation factors provided by BIS Shrapnel.

We conclude that Hunter Water’s approach to calculating the costs of Tillegra Dam and escalating these costs appears reasonable.
Modelling of options

In its response Hunter Water has undertaken additional modelling of a desalination plant option (which is triggered when storage levels reach 70 per cent of capacity) compared with the Dam option. In its revised modelling Hunter Water has taken onboard a number of the comments in our draft report. Some of the changes include:

- costs are presented on a ‘Whole-of-life’ basis rather than as levelised costs; and
- costs are presented as probability weighted costs. This is relevant for the desalination plant option where the probability of incurring the cost depends on the probability of storage levels falling below the 70 per cent trigger point.\(^{35}\)

Hunter Water acknowledges that further refinement of its modelling could be undertaken, however, it has not done so given that it believes that the case in favour of the Dam is so strong compared with other options. For the same reason Hunter Water has not undertaken detailed modelling of alternative operating regimes for the desalination plant but instead tests whether changing the operating costs to zero changes the ranking of options. It also has not incorporated the cost of water restrictions in the analysis because it believed that ‘the majority of customers placed no value on achieving a lower level of restriction’.

We accept that more detailed modelling may not be warranted in instances where there is a single option that is clearly superior to all other options. However, as discussed below, we do not believe that this is the case and, therefore, reiterate the need for Hunter Water to undertake more detailed modelling of options.

This additional modelling needs to be undertaken utilising Hunter Water’s hydrology models that take account of the hydrological characteristics of the catchments. This, for example, recognises persistence of inflow events such that the probability of having a low inflow event in a given year is related to the probability of having a low inflow event in the subsequent year. That is, the annual probabilities are not independent of each other, given that droughts typically occur over several years. It is important that these calculations also take other factors such as future population growth into account given their impact on storage levels and, therefore, the chance of dam levels falling below the trigger point.

The remainder of this section discusses some of our concerns regarding Hunter Water’s revised options analysis.

---

\(^{35}\) It should be noted that this is different to the trigger point for the desalination plant presented in Hunter Water’s H\textsubscript{50} document. In this document it appears that the majority of the expenditure related to the desalination plant is incurred once dam levels fall below 50 per cent of storage capacity. This would result in a lower probability weighted cost of the desalination plant compared to a 70 per cent trigger level.
Assumed suspension of the DMP

In the revised modelling undertaken by Hunter Water, the Dam option takes account of the capital and ongoing operating costs of the Dam, as well as the probability weighted costs if the Drought Management Plan (DMP) is triggered. However, in this analysis it assumes that the ‘DMP is suspended during the construction’ of the Dam. The DMP only becomes operational once again six years after commencing the construction of the Dam.

It is not clear to us why Hunter Water has made this assumption for the analysis of the Dam but not for the analysis of the desalination plant. The upshot of this assumption is that it significantly reduces the costs of the Dam option compared with the desalination plant option that Hunter Water has modelled. However, this comes at the expense of what appears to be a substantial reduction in security of supply for the Dam option over the short term.

This seems to be contrary to Hunter Water’s previous comments which emphasises the need for immediate action given that storage levels can deplete rapidly in its system. As Hunter Water states,

> At the time of writing our storages stand at 80 per cent full. Under a drought of similar the magnitude to that which recently affected our neighbours the NSW Central Coast, there would be no effective means of preventing complete exhaustion of the urban water supply system.\(^\text{36}\)

Importantly, if the DMP was assumed to be operating from year 1, it would increase the cost of the Dam option and change the ranking of the projects such that the Dam is no longer superior. For example, if the DMP was assumed to be operating for the first six years, it would raise the cost of the Dam option by $390 million in net present value terms.\(^\text{37}\) Based on this change the cost of the Dam option would increase from $435 million to $825 million in 2008-09 dollars. According to Hunter Water’s revised options analysis (presented in table A.2 of its response to our draft report), the desalination option results in a cost of $603 million (with zero operating costs) or $790 million (with the desalination plant operating at full capacity). This implies that the desalination plant option would be considered to be superior to the Dam if similar assumptions were made in respect of the security of supply over the first six years of the period of analysis.

Given this, Hunter Water’s conclusion regarding the superiority of the Dam option compared with the desalination plant option hinges to a large extent on the differential treatment of risk between the options examined. Based on the broad

---


\(^{37}\) The estimate of $390 million is based on the probabilities presented in Hunter Water’s revised modeling presented in response to our draft report for the first six years of the DMP.
analysis conducted above, it would appear that with a consistent treatment of risk across options the desalination plant option would be considered to be superior to the Dam option.

Hunter Water has not provided any information that examines the impact of this assumption on the security of supply for the region or provided any information that suggests that a less secure supply would be considered optimal from the community’s perspective.

**Probability of triggering the DMP**

Hunter Water’s revised options analysis is based on the desalination plant being triggered when storage levels fall below 70 per cent, as envisaged in its DMP. However, in its response to our draft report Hunter Water has indicated that recent changes could mean that there is a higher probability of triggering the desalination plant than previously envisaged. Hunter Water states that,

> The trigger point for the DMP is set to ensure that there is sufficient time to construct an emergency desalination plant just in time before other storages are exhausted. During this time the rate of depletion of the other storages is reduced by accessing additional groundwater reserves within Worimi National Park. Figure 3.5 of the Submissions Report shows that this would extend storages for around 14 months and this is the basis of setting the DMP trigger point at 70 per cent under current demand.

However extraction of groundwater reserves from Worimi National Park would lead to seawater being drawn into the sandbeds with significant environmental consequences. The NSW Office of Water has made it clear that they would strongly oppose such a development. Without access to Worimi National Park, the trigger point for starting the emergency desalination plant becomes 100 per cent.38

It is important to clarify with the NSW Office of Water its position with regard to the additional groundwater reserves. Further, it will also be useful to understand the extent of the environmental damaged caused by accessing these groundwater reserves compared with the potential damage caused by the Dam option.

It is important to recognise that changing this trigger point will significantly change the probability weighted costs relating to the desalination plant option. Hunter Water indicates, for example, that

> the removal of the groundwater reserves would in effect bring about immediate triggering of the DMP with an increase in probability weighted cost from $603 million to $878 million, from the immediate implementation of emergency desalination.39

Similarly, if the trigger level was lowered it would also lower the probability weighted costs of the desalination option. Using Hunter Water’s revised modelling if

---


39 Email correspondence from Hunter Water, 27 September 2010.
the probability of triggering the desalination plant option falls from 10 per cent to 5 per cent this lowers the cost of this option from $603 million to $426 million.

Further, the distribution of storage levels is not likely to be symmetric. So, for example, while there is a 10 per cent chance of storages falling below 70 per cent of capacity, there may only be a 1 per cent probability of storages falling below 60 per cent of capacity. Hunter Water should provide further information on the probability of reaching different storage levels so as to provide a better understanding of the risk profile of alternative trigger levels.

It is important to recognise that the decision regarding the trigger point for constructing the desalination plant option incorporates a range of factors such as the expected storage depletion rates and lead time for constructing the plant. It also reflects the risk preferences of Hunter Water and the Government (on behalf of the community). In this sense there is no single correct answer in regards to the appropriate trigger point for constructing the desalination plant as it will partly depend on the risk preferences of the community.

Hunter Water’s approach in regards to the trigger level for the desalination plant appears to be quite conservative and is based on being able to provide water in the event that there are several consecutive periods of a drought similar to that which occurred in 1979–80. The estimated probability of such an event occurring has been reported as being around 1 in 10 million.40

Given this, we believe that it is important that Hunter Water provides further information on the probability weighted costs of the desalination plant option under alternative (both higher and lower) trigger levels and the different level of risk imposed under each of these different trigger levels. It is possible that there are different trigger levels that, for example, results in a substantially lower cost with only a marginally higher level of risk. Such alternatives may be preferred by the community compared with an option of triggering the construction of the plant when dam levels reach 70 per cent of total storage capacity.

**Treatment of environmental and social impacts**

In our draft report we raised concerns regarding the approach adopted by Hunter Water in relation to the treatment of environmental and social impacts of the alternative options examined. In its response to the draft report Hunter Water indicates that it believes that the analysis that it has undertaken clearly demonstrates the Dam option is far superior to the alternative options. Given this, it does not

---

believe that further analysis to refine the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis or undertake a more detailed assessment of the environmental and social impacts is warranted.

Hunter Water also argues that many of the options considered have fundamentally significant environmental or social impacts which render these options unviable. For example, Hunter Water deems that a new Chichester Dam option is unviable as it would result in the flooding of 270 ha of National Park and 80 ha of World Heritage listed rainforest.

Given that there are typically a wide range of options that could be considered in developing a water resource management plan, it is reasonable for Hunter Water to adopt a preliminary ‘filter’ that rejects those options that would result in significant (and potentially irreversible) environmental and social impacts.

Based on this filtering approach, Hunter Water concludes that the desalination plant and the Dam are the only two options that are viable for comparison, given the substantial environmental and social costs of the other options.

While Hunter Water’s approach is useful as a filtering process to narrow down the options, there still needs to be some systematic approach to considering the magnitude of social and environmental impacts associated with each of the desalination plant and the Dam options. This is particularly the case given that, in our view, the evidence presented to us by Hunter Water does not fully demonstrate that the Dam is superior to alternative options.

We are not in a position to comment on the extent of environmental and social impacts under each of these options and leave it to others to comment on these issues. However, any examination of these issues needs to be considered in a portfolio context that takes account of both the direct and indirect impacts of the options examined.
References


